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We extend Akerlof ’s (1970) “Market for Lemons” by assuming that
some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy
signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale. Over-
confident buyers do not update according to Bayes’ rule but take the
noisy signal at face value. The main finding is that the presence of
overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing
total adverse selection. This stabilization, however, comes at a cost:
rational buyers are crowded out of the market.
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1. Introduction
There are many markets for used goods that seem to work quite well. In particular
nowadays in the age of the Internet, there exist many platforms where tremen-
dous amounts of used goods of all kinds are traded, most prominently eBay. For
instance, the trade volume of eBay Motors in the United States is approximately
36000 cars sold each month (Lewis, fortcoming). Markets for used goods, in par-
ticular used cars where stakes are relatively high, having a high volume of trade
is puzzling from the perspective of standard economics. It seems reasonable to
presume that the potential seller of a used commodity, say the used car, has a
good idea of the quality of her car, whereas the potential buyer obtains only little
information whether the car on display is a “lemon” or a “cream puff”. Given
this information structure, standard models of adverse selection predict that only
low-quality goods are traded in equilibrium and that the volume of trade is low
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(Akerlof, 1970). In the extreme, the asymmetric information problem can lead to
a complete market breakdown. A seller who owns a cream puff prefers not to offer
her car on the market, which reduces the average quality on the market and in
turn the trade volume. Besides casual observations that markets for used goods
function well, also empirical works investigating markets for used cars find only
weak evidence for adverse selection (Bond, 1982; Genesove, 1993).
We provide one possible explanation for this puzzling gap between theoretical
predictions and empirical observations in a fairly simple but standard framework of
a market with asymmetric information: if the buyer is overconfident with positive
probability, then there always exists an equilibrium in which high-quality goods
are traded. Moreover, if it is sufficiently likely that the buyer is overconfident, then
all pure-strategy equilibria are pooling equilibria in which all qualities are traded.
The presence of overconfident buyers thus can stabilize the market and helps to
prevent the total adverse selection outcome. This market stabilization, however,
comes at a cost: rational buyers do not participate in the market anymore.
2. The Model
A seller (S) owns one unit of an indivisible good, the quality of which is q ∈
{qL, qH} with 0 ≤ qL < qH .
1 Her reservation price for quality q is r(q), with
r(qL) = rL and r(qH) = rH . The probability of S being endowed with high
quality is α ∈ (0, 1). The buyer (B)’s valuation for quality q, v(q), is normalized
such that v(qL) = qL and v(qH) = qH .
Assumption 1.
(i) qH − rH ≥ qL − rL
(ii) qL − rL > 0
(iii) rH > q¯ := αqH + (1− α)qL
Assumption 1 (i) and (ii) together guarantee that there are positive gains from
trade for all quality levels, an assumption usually imposed in the literature.2
Moreover, we are interested in markets in which there is an adverse selection
problem in the sense that high-quality sellers value the item above the average
quality, Assumption 1 (iii). If Assumption 1 (iii) is violated there does always exist
a pooling equilibrium. It is important to note that Assumption 1 (iii) implies that
B’s willingness to pay for a low-quality item is below the reservation price of a
high-quality seller, qL < rH .
While B cannot directly observe quality, he receives a private signal s ∈ {L,H},
which is positively correlated with true quality, γ = Pr(s = H|q = qH) = Pr(s =
1This setup is common in the literature and used, for instance, by Ellingsen (1997).
2Assumption 1 (i) is made in order to simplify the exposition.
2
L|q = qL) ∈ (1/2, 1). We refer to s = H and s = L as the “good” and the “bad”
signal, respectively.
There are two potential types of buyers, τ ∈ {R,O}: with probability 1 − λ,
B is a rational Bayesian updater (τ = R), who draws the correct informational
inference from the signal he receives. With probability λ ∈ [0, 1), B is overconfi-
dent (τ = O) in his own ability to judge the quality of the item from his private
signal in the sense that he believes the signal to be perfectly informative.
Two prominent notions of overconfidence are overprecision and overestimation.
While overprecision refers to people believing their estimates to be more accurate
than they actually are, overestimation alludes to people overestimating their own
abilities.3 Our model captures both these biases: if the buyer wrongly believes
his noisy signal to be perfectly accurate, then he is prone to overestimation; if he
wrongly believes to be an expert who can perfectly determine the quality of the
item on display by inspecting it, then he suffers from the overestimation.
Both S and B are risk neutral and maximize expected profits and expected
utility, respectively. While S’s profit from selling at price p is pi = p − r, B’s
utility from purchasing quality q at price p is u = q − p. If no trade takes place,
S’s profit and B’s utility are zero.
The sequence of events is as follows. (i) Nature draws q ∈ {qL, qH}. (ii) S
observes q and sets a take-it-or-leave-it price p ∈ R. A pure strategy for S is a pair
(pL, pH), where pL (pH) denotes the price for a low-quality (high-quality) item.
(iii) Nature draws τ ∈ {R,O} and s ∈ {L,H}. (iv) Upon privately observing p
and s, B decides whether to buy the item. A pure strategy for a buyer of type
τ is a function bτ : R × {L,H} −→ {0, 1}, where bτ (p, s) = 1 means “buy” and
bτ (p, s) = 0 means “don’t buy” at price p and for signal s. (v) Both parties receive
their respective payoffs, pi = (p− r)bτ (p, s) and u = (q − p)bτ (p, s).4
We augment the usual notion of (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure
strategies in order to allow for an overconfident buyer.5 Let µτs(p) denote the belief
held by buyer type τ ∈ {R,O} about high quality being offered when observing
price p and receiving signal s. Let µτ = {(µτL(p), µ
τ
H(p)) ∈ [0, 1]
2|p ∈ R}.
Definition 1. A market equilibrium is a vector (µR, µO, (pL, pH), b
R(p, s),
bO(p, s)) that satisfies the following conditions:
(B1) If pL 6= pH , then µ
R
L(pL) = µ
R
H(pL) = 0 and µ
R
L(pH) = µ
R
H(pH) = 1.
(B2) If pL = pH = p¯, then
µRH(p¯) =
γα
γα+ (1− γ)(1− α)
and µRL(p¯) =
(1− γ)α
(1− γ)α+ γ(1− α)
. (1)
3See Alpert and Raiffa (1982) or Soll and Klayman (2004) on overprecision, and Clayson (2005)
or Buehler, Griffin, and Ross (1994) on overestimation.
4The analysis would remain unchanged if all draws by nature occurred in step (i).
5Focusing on pure-strategy equilibria often allows us to obtain a unique equilibrium outcome
without applying an equilibrium refinement.
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(B3) For all p ∈ R and s ∈ {L,H}, µOL (p) = 0 and µ
O
H(p) = 1.
(SR) At each information set, the concerned player’s strategy is a best response to
the other player’s strategy under the belief induced by µ at that information
set.
(B1) and (B2) specify a rational buyer’s beliefs on the equilibrium path: if S
charges different prices for different qualities, an incompletely informed rational
buyer should—irrespective of the signal he receives—believe the item to be of low
quality if he observes price pL and of high quality if he observes price pH ; if S
charges the same price for both high-quality and low-quality items, then a rational
buyer’s beliefs are determined by Bayes’ rule. (B3) specifies that an overconfident
buyer takes the signal at face value irrespective of the price. Last, (SR) requires
sequential rationality.
Finally, let ρL and ρH denote the trading probabilities in equilibrium for low-
quality and high-quality goods, respectively.
3. The Analysis
The following observations hold irrespective of B’s type: first, sequential ratio-
nality requires bτ (p, s) = 1 for p ≤ qL and b
τ (p, s) = 0 for p > qH . Thus, in
any equilibrium low quality must be traded with strictly positive probability at
a price of at least qL and at most qH—otherwise S could profitably deviate to
p = qL. Likewise, high quality will never be priced strictly below rH because
S could profitably deviate to p > qH . Hence, there are three potential kinds of
equilibria: (i) pooling equilibrium, i.e., pL = pH = p¯ ∈ [rH , qH ], (ii) separating
equilibrium with trade of high-quality items, i.e., pL = qL and pH ∈ [rH , qH ]
and (iii) separating equilibrium without trade of high-quality items (total adverse
selection), i.e., pL = qL and pH ≥ qH .
3.1. No Overconfidence and Total Adverse Selection
If the signal is sufficiently imprecise, then no pooling equilibrium exists. Intu-
itively, with q¯ < rH , B purchases at the pooling price p¯ ≥ rH only if he receives
positive information about the quality on display, i.e., s = H. If the signal is
highly uninformative, however, then B’s willingness to pay after receiving s = H
is below rH and thus no pooling equilibrium exists.
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For λ = 0 there does not exist a
pure-strategy pooling equilibrium if
γ < γ˜ :=
(rH − qL)(1− α)
(qH − rH)α+ (rH − qL)(1− α)
∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. (2)
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Moreover, for a sufficiently imprecise signal there does not exist a separating
equilibrium with trade of high-quality items. Intuitively, a pure-strategy separat-
ing equilibrium is most likely to exist if B purchases the high-quality item only
after receiving s = H, which requires that pH = qH . However, even if B follows
this strategy, then a low-quality seller can profitably mimic a high-quality seller
if B receiving a good signal is sufficiently likely to occur also in the case of low
quality.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For λ = 0 there does not exist a
pure-strategy separating equilibrium with ρH > 0 if
γ < γˆ :=
qH − qL
qH − rL
∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. (3)
In what follows, we restrict attention to a rather signal noisy.
Assumption 2. γ < min{γˆ, γ˜}.
We can always support a separating equilibrium without trade of high quality—
this is most obvious for pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs, i.e., µRs (p) = 0 for
all p < qH and s ∈ {L,H}. Thus, for a fairly noisy signal, the market exhibits
the well-known adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970).
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For λ = 0, in all pure-
strategy equilibria it holds that pL = qL, pH ≥ qH , ρL = 1 and ρH = 0.
3.2. Overconfidence and Market Stabilization
The first observation is that total adverse selection is not a feasible equilibrium
outcome if there are overconfident buyers in the market. A seller of high quality
can always ask for a price higher than her reservation value—pH ∈ (rH , qH ]—that
allows her to sell with positive probability because she sells at least to an overcon-
fident buyer who receives a good signal. Even if there are only few overconfident
buyers and even if the signal is fairly noisy, this strategy leads to strictly positive
profits in expectations. Thus, if there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium, then
both qualities are traded in this equilibrium. In the following, we characterize
this equilibrium and establish conditions for its existence.
First, we show the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which high-quality
items are traded with strictly positive probability even when the signal is very
uninformative, i.e., Assumption 2 holds. In any pooling equilibrium with trade
of high quality we must have p¯ ∈ [rH , qH ]. Upon observing price p¯, beliefs of a
rationally updating buyer are determined according to (B2), whereas beliefs of
an overconfident buyer are given by (B3). In consequence, upon observing price
p¯ and signal s ∈ {H,L}, a rational buyer purchases the item if
p¯ ≤ q¯(s) ≡ µs(p¯)qH + (1− µs(p¯))qL. (4)
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Thus, for γ < γ˜, rational buyers do not purchase at price p¯ because q¯(L) <
q¯(H) < rH . An overconfident buyer, on the other hand, purchases if p¯ ≤ qs, and
therefore buys the item at price p¯ if he receives s = H. Hence, irrespective of
her item’s quality, for any price p¯ ∈ [rH , qH) the seller has an incentive to deviate
to the highest price at which trade possibly takes place, such that the only price
consistent with a pooling equilibrium is p¯ = qH . To establish existence of a pooling
equilibrium with price p¯ = qH , consider pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs for
a rational buyer, i.e., µs(p) = 0 for all p 6= p¯ and s ∈ {L,H}. Since the seller of
a low-quality item can always sell for sure at a price qL, p¯ = qH can only be part
of a pooling equilibrium if qL − rL ≤ λ(1− γ)(qH − rL), or equivalently, if
λ ≥
qL − rL
(1− γ)(qH − rL)
=: λ¯. (5)
Note that γ < γˆ implies λ¯ < 1. Since a high-quality seller obviously has no reason
to deviate, there exists a pooling equilibrium even for an fairly noisy signal as
long as the share of overconfident buyers is sufficiently large.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for λ ∈ (0, 1)
there does not exist a pure-strategy separating equilibrium. If λ ≥ λ¯, then there
exists a pure-strategy equilibrium with a pooling price pL = pH = qH and trading
probabilities ρL = λ(1− γ) and ρH = λγ.
From the above proposition, the next result—for the case where there are almost
no gains from trade for low-quality items—follows immediately.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that qL → rL. Then, for
λ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium and any pure-strategy equilibrium
is a pooling equilibrium.
According to Corollary 1, if the low-quality item is basically useless, then an
arbitrary small proportion of overconfident buyers in the market is sufficient to
avoid the undesirable total adverse selection outcome.
3.3. Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
One question is immediately at hand from Proposition 2: what happens for λ < λ¯,
i.e., if neither a pure-strategy pooling equilibrium nor a pure-strategy separating
equilibrium exists. In this case, there exists a mixed-strategy separating equi-
librium with trade of high-quality items. The equilibrium prices are pL = qL
and pH = qH . In one equilibrium, with pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the
buyer plays the mixed strategy: b(pH , H) = σ ∈ (0, 1), b(p, s) = 1 for p ≤ qL, and
b(p, s) = 0 in the remaining cases. If the mixing probability σ is sufficiently small,
then the low-quality seller has no incentives to mimic the high-quality seller. For
pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs the mixing probability needs to satisfy
σ ≤ λ¯− λ =: σ¯. (6)
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In this equilibrium, rational buyers as well as overconfident buyers and both types
of sellers are active. A mixed-strategy separating equilibrium with trade of high-
quality items also exists in the case without overconfident buyers (λ = 0). In this
mixed-strategy equilibrium, the maximum trading probability for high quality is
ρH(λ) = [λ¯− λ(λ¯− λ)]γ. (7)
With ρ(λ) < ρ(0) for λ ∈ (0, λ¯), in this mixed-strategy equilibrium the presence
of overconfident buyers reduces the probability that high quality is traded which
in turn depletes market efficiency.
4. Conclusion
On the one hand, Akerlof (1970)’s seminal contribution spawned a large literature
investigating markets with asymmetric information. On the other hand, overcon-
fident agents have been introduced into various economic settings, e.g. Grubb
(2009), Englmaier (2010, 2011) or Sandroni and Squintani (2007). Nevertheless,
to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that incorporates overconfident
buyers into the classic market for “lemons”. We find that the presence of over-
confident buyers increases the trading volume of high quality and thus prevents
total adverse selection. Since buyers’ overconfidence can lead to an improvement
of market efficiency, the often found suggestion that buyers should be educated to
make better judgments in uncertain environments deserves more thoughtful con-
sideration. Our findings complement the observation in Eyster and Rabin (2005)
that the presence of “behavioral actors” may improve market outcomes.
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A. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas (not for
publication)
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, in contradiction, that the price p¯ constitutes a pool-
ing equilibrium. We know that we must have p¯ ∈ [rH , qH ]. Given price p¯, a
rational buyer’s belief about the item being of high quality after receiving signal
s ∈ {L,H} is given by µs(p¯) according to (B2) and he will buy the item if and
only if
p¯ ≤ µs(p¯)qH + (1− µs(p¯))qL =: q¯(s). (8)
Since q¯(L) < q¯ < rH , for a pooling equilibrium with trade of high-quality items
to exist, we must have p¯ ∈ [rH , q¯(H)]. Put differently, if a pooling equilibrium
exists then the buyer will purchase the item only after receiving the good signal
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s = H. Note that limγց1/2 q¯(H) = q¯, limγր1 q¯(H) = qH , and dq¯(H)/dγ > 0.
Hence, by the intermediate-value theorem, there exists a unique value γ˜ such that
q¯(H) = rH .
Finally, note that γ˜ > 1/2, or equivalently
(1− α)(rH − qL) > α(qH − rH), (9)
by Assumption 1 (iii), which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, according to (B1), in any separating equilibrium with
equilibrium prices pL 6= pH we have µs(pL) = 0 and µs(pH) = 1 for s ∈ {L,H}.
This implies that pL = qL: if pL > qL, then the buyer would not buy and the
seller of a low-quality item could profitably deviate to a price p ∈ (rL, qL], thereby
selling for sure; if pL < qL, then the seller of a low-quality item could profitably
deviate to p = qL, thereby still selling for sure at a higher price. Next, whenever
a high-quality seller sells with strictly positive probability in equilibrium, i.e.,
ρH > 0, we must have pH ∈ [rH , qH ]. Note that, since µs(pH) = 1, sequential
rationality requires that the buyer always buys for pH ∈ [rH , qH). This, however
cannot be part of any equilibrium because a low-quality seller could profitably
deviate to price pH . Therefore. in any separating equilibrium in which the seller
of a high-quality item sells with strictly positive probability, we have ρH < 1 and
thus pH = qH (because B has to be indifferent between buying and not buying
at price pH). With our focus on pure strategies, for ρH < 1 to be feasible, the
buyer has to condition his purchasing decision at price pH on the realization of
the signal he receives, i.e., b(pH , s) = 1 for s ∈ B ⊂ {L,H} and b(pH , s) = 0 for
s ∈ {L,H}\B. With Pr(H|qL) < Pr(L|qL), the seller of a low-quality item will
definitely deviate to pH = qH if Pr(H|qL)(qH − rL) > (qL − rL), or equivalently,
if γ < γˆ. Noting that γˆ > 1/2 if and only if qH − qL > qL − rL, which holds by
Assumption 1, completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that a separating equilibrium without trade of
high-quality items always exist. The proposition follows from this observation
together with Lemmas 1 and 2.
In an adverse selection equilibrium, we must have pL = qL, pH ≥ qH , and
µs(pL) = 0 and µs(pH) = 1 for s ∈ {L,H}. With buyer behavior for prices
p ≤ qL and p > qH not depending on the buyer’s beliefs, in order to support the
equilibrium under consideration, we have to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs for
prices p ∈ (qL, qH ] such that neither type of seller has an incentive to deviate. One
set of beliefs doing the job is given by µs(p) ≤ (p− qL)/(qH − qL) for p ∈ (qL, qH ]
and s ∈ {L,H}. Since µs(p)qH + (1− µs(p))qL − p ≤ 0 it is sequentially rational
for the buyer never to buy at prices p ∈ (qL, qH ], which in turn implies that no
type of seller has an incentive to deviate to such prices.6
6Here, it is assumed that the buyer does not purchase the item if he is indifferent.
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Proof of Proposition 2. It remains to show that there does not exist a pure-strategy
separating equilibrium with trade of high-quality items. This kind of equilibrium
is most likely to exist if the Bayesian buyer has pessimistic out-of-equilibrium be-
liefs and purchases at pH only after receiving s = H. This strategy is sequentially
rational only for pH = qH . Moreover, we know that pL = qL. If the Bayesian
buyer uses this strategy, then he behaves (on the equilibrium path) exactly as an
overconfident buyer. Thus, the incentives to deviate to p = qH for a seller who
possesses a good of low-quality are independent of the probability with which
she faces an overconfident buyer. Hence, it follows immediately from Lemma 2
that a low-quality seller prefers to deviate if γ < γˆ. Thus, there does not exist a
pure-strategy separating equilibrium if Assumption 2 holds.
10
